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Quadratic Programming and the 
Single-Controller Stochastic Game* 
JERZY A. FILAR 
In this paper we show that an optimal solution to an appropriately constructed 
quadratic program provides a stationary Nash equilibrium point of a two-person, 
general-sum, single-controller stochastic game. Stochastic games with both the 
limiting average and the discounted payoff criteria are considered. For the latter, 
the converse statement also holds; that is. every stationary equilibrium point 
provides an optimal solution to the quadratic program. The above results include 
as special cases the known quadratic/linear programming formulations of bimatrix 
games, matrix games, Markovian decision processes, and single-controller zero-sum 
stochastic games. I( 1986 Academic Press. Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1964 Mangasarian and Stone [ 1 ] showed an interesting connection 
between quadratic programming and bimatrix games. In particular, they 
constructed a quadratic program which has a global maximum of zero, and 
the optima of which form Nash equilibrium points of the bimatrix game in 
question. In this paper we generalize the above result to the class of two- 
person, general-sum, single-controller stochastic games. Since this class of 
games includes zero-sum single-controller games, Markovian decision 
processes, bimatrix games, and matrix games, the optimal solutions to our 
quadratic programs can be converted to optimal/equilibrium solutions to 
the above models as well. Our results apply to models with both discoun- 
ted and limiting average reward criteria. 
It should be mentioned that the class of single-controller stochastic 
games, that is, games where only one player (player II in this paper) can 
influence the transition probabilities, has been studied extensively in recent 
years and is now known to possess many desirable properties which 
* This work was supported in part by the NSF Grant ECS-8204677. The author is indeb- 
ted to A. J. Goldman for reading the manuscript and for his helpful remarks. Any errors 
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general stochastic games lack. See, for instance, Parthasarathy and 
Raghavan [2], Vrieze [3], Hordijk and Kallenberg [4] and [S], Filar 
and Raghavan [6], and Filar [7]. Of the above, only references [2, 73 dis- 
cuss the general-sum version of the single-controller game. In [2] it is 
shown that these games possess “stationary equilibria” (i.e., equilibrium 
points consisting of stationary strategies) as well as the ordetfield property, 
that is, if all the data lie in some ordered Archimedean field then at least 
one of the equilibrium points will also lie in the same field. These results 
indicate that finite algorithms for computing an equilibrium point may 
exist. Indeed, in [7] a constructive characterization of the set of all 
stationary equilibria is given which contains a finite algorithm for finding 
all “extreme” stationary equilibria. However, since the methods in [7] 
depend essentially on enumerating the extreme points of certain polyhedral 
sets, these algorithms are likely to be inefficient in all but relatively small 
size problems. Consequently, the quadratic programs of this paper 
represent, perhaps, the most promising approach (to date) for efficient 
computation of at least one Nash equilibrium point of a single-controller 
stochastic game. In deriving our results, extensive use is made of the impor- 
tant techniques developed by Hordijk and Kallenberg [S] in the context of 
undiscounted Markovian Decision Processes, as well as of the results in 
reference [2]. Finally, it must be mentioned that N-person, general-sum 
Stochastic games were first studied by Rogers [9] and Sobel [lo] who 
employed fixed-point theorems to establish the existence of stationary 
equilibria in the discounted case, with no restrictions on the law of motion. 
2. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION 
A two-person, noncooperative stochastic game r is played in stages. At 
each stage the game is in one of finitely many states, s = 1, 2,..., S, in which 
players I and II are obliged to play once a bimatrix game, 
R-; = (rl(s, i, j))y;$, , R; = (rz(s, i, j))?;:;. 
The law of motion is defined by the probabilities q(s’I ,s, i, j), where 
{s’ls, i, j) is the event that the game will enter state s’ at the next stage, 
given that the current state of the game is s and players I and II choose 
their ith and jth actions, respectively. In this paper we shall assume that 
player II controls the law of motion, that is, q(s’ / s, i, j) = q(s’ 1 s, j) for all 
’ Whenever we write f(g) in place off(g) we are emphasizing that a stationary strategy for 
player I (II) is being treated as a row (column) vector of dimension C.y,, rn, (x,S=, n,). The 
superscript T will always denote the matrix transpose operation. 
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states s. A stationurj, strateg?” ,f’ for player I may represented by a com- 
positite row vector of dimension x:~m , m,, 
.I’= (f( 1 L f(2),..., f(.v)> 
where each f(s) is a probability vector 
f(s) = (f,(J), .M~),...> A,$(.~)). 
Here, h(s) is the probability that player I chooses the ith action of the 
bimatrix game (R;, R;) whenever the game is in state s. Player 11s 
stationary strategies are similarly defined. Let F and G denote the sets of 
stationary strategies for players I and II, respectively. 
With a pair of stationary strategies (f; g) for players I and II we can 
associate a pair of current reward (column) vectors 
h(.L g) = (rdf, g)(l), rk(.fi g)(2),-., rd.f, s)(S))T, k= 1, 2, 
where for each s = 1, 2 ,..., S, 
rk(f, g)(s) = C C rk(s3 6 .A f,(s) gibe), k= 1, 2. (1) 
,=I ,=l 
Further, a stationary strategy, g, for player II defines and S x S Markov 
matrix 
Q(g)= (ds’ls, g)):,.L 1, 
where for each s = 1, 2 ,..., S, 
q(s’ /s, g) = 2 q(s’ 1 s, j) g,(s). 
/=I 
(2) 
Moreover, it is known that there exists a Markov matrix Q*(g) such that 
,A 
Q*(s)=,~~~ (l/(N+ 1)) C Q”(g). (3) 
IS = 0 
Now, if players I and II use the stationary strategy pair (,f; g) throughout 
the whole game, their average (undiscounted) rewards can be written as 
h(.f, g) = Q*(s) rk(.L 8) for k = 1, 2. (4) 
The sth component of the above vector equation indicates the rewards ear- 
ned when the initial state is S, and is denoted by c+~,(,L g)(s) for player I and 
by h(f; g)@) for player 11. 
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A pair of strategies (f”, g”) constitutes a (Nash) Equilibrium Point (EP) 
if for every s = 1, 2 ,..., S, the inequalities 
41(f0Y f7(s) 3 dl(f, g”)(s) for all ,A 
d*(f”* &Is) 2 4*(f”, g)(s) for all g, 
are all satisfied. 
Even though f and g in the above conditions are restricted to be 
stationary strategies it is known that (f”, g”) will be an equilibrium point 
in the space of all strategies, some of which may depend on the histories of 
the process (a proof of this runs along the lines of Derman [ 11, Theorem 1, 
P. 911). 
We shall also discuss single-controller games with a-discounted rewards. 
In this case, if players I and II use the stationary strategies (A g) E Fx G 
their payoffs will be defined by 
4; (A 8) = [I- d?(g)1 ~ ’ rdf, g) (5) 
for k = 1, 2 and a E [0, 1 ), where c( is the discount factor. The definition of 
an equilibrium point for these discounted games extends analogously. 
Irrespective of whether the game f is discounted or undiscounted, we shall 
define the set E,=((f, g)EFxGI(,f, g) is an equilibrium point of r}. In 
[2] Parthasarathy and Raghavan have shown (nonconstructively) that E, 
is nonempty. In the next section we shall prove that an element of E,. can 
be obtained from an optimal solution of an appropriately constructed 
quadratic program. 
3. QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING FORMULATION OF THE GAME 
Unless specified otherwise, the game r will from now on be the 
undiscounted single-controller stochastic game. The following arguments 
will have the logical structure of those of Mangasarian and Stone [ 1 ] but 
they will depend essentially on the results derived by Parthasarathy and 
Raghavan [2] and Hordijk and Kallenberg [S]. 
With the original game r= (4,) &) we can associate a game r’ = 
(4;) I$*), where for each pair of stationary strategies (f, g), player I’s 
payoff in l-’ is defined by 
d’l(f, g)(s) = rl(f, g)(s), s = 1) 2 )...) s. 
Quite clearly an equilibrium point of r’ is also an equilibrium point of r. 
In [2] Parthasarathy and Raghavan proved that r’ possesses a stationary 
equilibrium point (f “, g”) E E,.. Indeed, they have shown that when the 
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data defining the game lie in some ordered Archimedan field then all the 
entries of at least one pair in E,-, lie in the same held. 
Furthermore, it ought to be clear that withJ’E F held fixed, the problem 
of finding v = max, &(,J g) is exactly the average reward Markovian 
Decision problem (AMD) which can be solved with the help of a pair of 
primal-dual linear programs constructed as follows: 
Define block-diagonal matrices R, = diag( RA, Ri,..., Rf), k = 1, 2. These 
are of dimensions Es=, m, x Cf=, n,,. Also choose an arbitrary (and fixed) 
probability vector fi’ = (fi( 1 ),..., /3(S)) with strictly positive components. 
Further, let q; = (q( 1 1 S, j) ,..., q(S 1 s, ,i)) for all s andj = l,..., n,, and let e, be 
the sth row of the S x S identity matrix. Now for each s, define three n, x S 
matrices E,, Q,,, K, such that the jth rows of E, and Q are e, and q,!, 
respectively, and K,, = E,, - Q,. Let K = (K:, Kl ,..., G)’ and E = 
(E:, ET,..., Eg)T be two block-column matrices of dimensions (C;‘=, n,) x S. 
Finally, consider the dual pair of linear programs’: 
min fiTv, max fR,x 
Ev+Kt>RTfT ’ 2 ) and 
xTE + yTK = pT, 
Kv>O (PI xTK=OT, 
x, y30 (D). 
In [8] Hordijk and Kallenberg showed that if (v”, t”) and (x”, y”) are 
optimal solutions to the programs (P) and (D) respectively, then v” = max, 
42(L 8) = $2(.f, g’l where g” = M(x”, y”) E G with M being an 
appropriately constructed (and easily applied) map of the feasible region of 
(D) onto the set of stationary strategies for player II. In addition Hordijk 
and Kallenberg construct an exp!icit map 6f: G + feasible points of (D), 
such that M(fi(g)) = g for all g6 G. While M is not 1 : 1, it maps optimal 
solutions of (D) onto optimal policies of the AMD-process max, @(J g) 
and similarly, A? maps optimal policies onto optimal solutions of (D). 
We now construct the quadratic program: 




(c) xTE + yTK = pT, 
(d) x=K = OT, 
(e) R;x(s) d 5,l for all s= l,..., S, 
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(f) f(s) 1 = 1 for all s= l,..., S, 
(g) fbOT and x, y>O, (QP) 
where the vector of variables is i = (f, xT, yT, vT, tT, 5’) and has dimension 
of [(xf=, m,) + 2(x;‘, 1 H,~) +3S]. Note that all the coefficient matrices of 
(QP) are defined by the data of the stochastic game, and 1 denotes a 
column vector with 1 in all entries. For brevity we shall denote the objec- 
tive function of (QP) by $(c). Th e main results of this paper are contained 
in the following generalization of a Theorem due to Mangasarian and 
Stone [I]. 
MAIN THEOREM. Let (f”, g”) he any equilibrium point of I- whirh is an 
element qf E,-, and let (vO, t”) and (x”, y”) = &?(g”) he optimal solutions to 
the linear programs (P) and (D) induced by f”, and 5” he defined by 5: = 
f”(s) Rj x”(s) for each s = l,..., S. Then 4” = (f”, xCJT, VT, VT, toT) is an optimal 
solution to the quadrutic program (QP), und Y(<“) = 0. On the other hand, if 
c” is optimal ,for (QP) and g”= 44(x”, y”) then (f”, g”) is an equilibrium 
point of I-. 
ProoJ: (i) We know that there exists (,f”, g”)~ E,., (see [2, Sect. 61). 
That is, for all s = l,..., S, 
and 
rl(fi s”)(s) G r,(.f”, g”)(s), .f’cE (6) 
4A.f (‘3 g)(s) d b(f ‘I? g”), gEG. (7) 
In particular, (7) implies that g” is an optimal policy in the AMD process 
maxR &(f “, g). Let P and D be the feasible regions of the dual linear 
programs (P) and (D) (with f =f”) and construct the transformations 
M: D + G and p: G -+ D as in [8, Sect. 3.31. It now follows from [S, 
Theorem 81 that (x0, y”) = &(g”) is optimal in (D). Now if (I+, t”) is any 
optimal solution of (P) and 5” and c” are defined as in the statement of the 
theorem, then it first has to be shown that 5” is feasible for (QP). The fact 
that f0 E F and the construction of <” immediately ensure that the con- 
straints (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), and (g) are satisfied by &“. To verify the con- 
straints (e), note that from (6) we have 
ejR;g”(s) < f”(s) Rig”(s) (8) 
for s = i,..., S, i = l,..., m,, with ei denoting the ith row of an m, x m, iden- 
tity matrix. However, from the definitions of M and Q (see [S, Sect. 3.31) 
and the fact that M(fi(g”)) = g” it follows that whenever xp > 0, x0(s) = 
g”(s) Xf> where xz= lTx”(s) (we regard x0 = (~“(l)~,..., x”(S)~)~ as a 
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column vector of the same dimension as g”). Since s: = 0 only when 
x”(s) = 0, statement (8) now yields 
R”, x”(s) < (‘$1, .v=l,2 S . . . . . ) (9) 
and hence c” is feasible for (QP). Furthermore, from the Duality Theorem 
of Linear Programming applied to (P) and (D) we have 
f”R, x0 = B=f’, (10) 
and from the definitions of 5” and R, , 
f*R,x”= ; f”(s) R; x”(s)= lTko. (11) 
,=1 
In view of (10) and (11) we conclude that 
Y( i”) = 0. (12) 
Now let & = (f, xT, yT, vT, tT, 5’) be an arbitrary feasible solution for 
(QP); we shall show that Y(c) d 0, which by (12) will mean that c” was a 
global optimum. From the constraints (a), (g), (d), (c), and (b) it follows 
that 
fR,x 6 vTETx + tTKTx = vTErx = v’[fl- K’y] 
= v’fl- (vTKT) y < v’fL 
Further, constraints (e), (f), and (g) imply that 
(13) 
s s 
fR,x= c f(s)R;x(S)< c [,=l’& (14) 
?=I ,=I 
But (13) and (14) guarantee that Y(i) d 0, as required. 
(ii) Conversely, suppose that i” optimal for (QP). Then by the above 
arguments 
0 = !T’(<“) = f (f”(s) R”, x0(s) - 5:) + (f”R,x” - fl’v”). (15) 
\=I 
However, every term on the right side of (15) is nonpositive (see (13) and 
(14)), hence 
f”(s) R; x”(s) = 5:’ for s = 1, 2 ,..., S, (16) 
f”R, x0 = fjT# (17) 
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both hold. However, (17) together with constraints (a), (b), (c), (d), and 
(g) imply that (V, t”) and (x”, y”) are optimal in the linear programs (P) 
and (D), respectively (with f = f”). Thus by [S, Theorem 83, g” = M(x”, y”) 
is an optimal policy in the AMD problem max, &(f”, g). That is, 
Qz(f”3 g) 6 Qz(f”3 6’) for all g E G. (18) 
Further, if we let E(x”) = (S 1 x; = lTx”(s) > 0) then by [S, Proposition 51 
E(x”) is the set of recurrent states in the Markov chain induced by the 
stationary strategy g” of the controller (player II). That is, the columns of 
Q*(g”) (see (3)) corresponding to the states not in E(x”) are zero vectors. 
Recalling that g”(s)=x”(s)/x; for all SE ,5(x”), constraints (e) and (16) 
yield 
f(s) &g”(s) = r,(.f, g”)(s) < r,(fO, S”)(.~L s E E(x”) (19) 
for all f~ F. However, by the above comments for any .F= 1, 2,..., S, we 
have 
41th g”)(s)= ce*cs”, r,(fi s”)l, = c q*(~‘l~~~ 6’) r,(h g”Ns’) 
C’E (rO) 
< 1 q*(s’ Is, g”) r,(f”‘, g”)(d) = d,(f‘“, g”)(s), 
.\‘E E( ‘if’) 
(20) 
where q*(s’ 1 s, g”) is the (s, s’)th element of e*( g”), and [u],~ denotes the 
sth component of the vector u. In view of (18) and (20) we now have that 
,f” and g” = M(x”, y”) form a stationary equilibrium point of the original 
game II 1 
It is worth pointing out that an analogous result can be established by a 
somewhat simpler argument for the discounted single-controller stochastic 
games. In this case it is necessary to define K,s= E, -a& for each 
s = 1, 2,..., S. The matrices E and K are now constructed just as before, but 
the quadratic program (QP) is replaced by the simpler program in 
variables (f, xT, vT, 5’): 
max[f(R, + R2) x - fiTv - 1’51, 
subject to: 
(h) Kv 3 R=fT, 
(i) xTK = pT, 
(j) R;x(s) < <,Y1 for all s = 1, 2 ,..., S, 
(k) f(s) 1 = 1 for all s = 1, 2 ,..., S, 
(m) f>07‘andx20, (&QP) 
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where 0 is a column vector with 0 in every entry which has an appropriate 
dimension. In this case it is easy to see from constraints (i) that s, =X(S)’ 
1 > 0 for every s and hence that map M,: x + g. such that for every .Y 
g(s) = x(s)/x,\, is well defined. Indeed, it is known that for r E [0, 1 ), M, is 
an invertible map of the set {x / xTK = fi, x 3 0) onto G (see, for instance, 
Kallenberg [ 12, Chap. 31). Thus if (f”, x”‘, v”I’, 5”‘) is optimal for (zQP) 
then f” and g” = M,(x”) form an equilibrium point of the discounted single- 
controller game. Furthermore, by [2, Lemma 5.11 we have that E,. = E, in 
the discounted single-controller games so that the Main Theorem can be 
strengthened with the claim that every stationary equilibrium point of 
(f”, g”) of f can be converted to an optimal solution of (xQP). In the 
undiscounted case, however, it is possible to find examples in which 
E,# Er and hence the latter claim cannot be justified in the same fashion. 
4. REDUCTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In principle at least, the quadratic programs (QP) and (uQP) could be 
used to solve a number of other well-known models. These include: 
(i) Bimatrix Games: Simply set S = 1, and q( 1 1 1, ,i) E 1 for 
j= 1, 2 )...) n,. Then R, = R 1, R2 = Ri form a bimatrix game (R , , R,) played 
repeatedly. Now E = 1 and K = 0 (column vectors of dimension n, ), and 
(QP) reduces to precisely the quadratic program originally introduced by 
Mangasarian and Stone [ 11. Incidentally, setting S= 1 and 2 = 0 will 
reduce (aQP) to the same program. 
(ii) Zero-sum single-controller stochastic games: Simply set 
-R; = R.; for s = 1, 2,..., S in (QP), which then reduces to the primal-dual 
pair of linear programs (with v replaced by -4 without loss of generality): 
max fJ’$ min 1’5 
E+Kt- R:‘f’<O, xTE+ yrK= p’, 
K$<O, and x’K=O’, 
f(s) 1 = 1; s = l)...) s, R;x(s)<r,l; s= l,..., S, 
f(s) 3 0; s = I,...) s (P) x, y30 (B) 
The programs (P) and (D) are equivalent to those used by Vrieze [3] and 
Hordijk and Kallenberg [S] to solve these games. Of course, analogous 
reduction of (aQP) is possible. 
(iii) Markovian Decision Processes: In addition to the simplification 
in (ii), assume that every R,; is an 1 x n, matrix. Then the linear programs 
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(P) and (D) reduce to ones equivalent to those used by Hordijk and 
Kallenberg [S] to solve undiscounted Markovian Decision Processes. 
Again a similar reduction in the discounted case yields the well-known 
linear programs for that case (e.g., see Derman [ 11, Chap. 41). 
(iv) Matrix games: Of course, the classical linear programming for- 
mulation can be obtained from both (QP) and (aQP) via (i) as 
Mangasarian and Stone pointed out. 
Remark 4.1. The obvious limitation on the applicability of the 
quadratic programs (QP) and (aQP) stems from the fact that the standard 
algorithms will converge only to a Kuhn-Tucker point which may not be a 
global optimum. In such a case the search must be reinitiated at another 
point. However, Mangasarian and Stone [l] report that at least in the 
special case (i) this undesirable phenomenon did not occur in their 
experience. 
5. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE 
In this section we shall compute an equilibrium point of a simple 
stochastic game using the quadratic program (QP) of Section 3. The game 
has only two states (i.e., S = 2) and is described (using the notation of Sec- 
tions 2 and 3 by two bimatrix games, 
and the law of motion matrices: 
That is, if in state 2 players I and II choose actions 2 and 1, respectively, 
then they will receive payoffs of 6 and 5, respectively, and the next state of 
the game will be 1 with probability .2 and 2 with probability .8. Recalling 
that the elements of the jth row of Q, are q(s’ 1 s, j)‘, as s’ ranges over the 
states, we easily check that the matrices E and K appearing in the con- 
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NOW, taking fiT= (0.5, 0.5) we can explicitly state the problem (Qp) in the 
variables i=(f,(l), .fdU, f,(2), .f2(2L s,(l), .yJl), -u,(2), .uJ~), J,(I ). 
Yz(l), y,(2), y,(2), u,, L’>, t,, tz, r,, (2) as follows: 
maximize (7,1;(l)x,(l)+7,fz(l).v,(l)+,f‘,(2).u,(2)+ 14,f’,(2).rr(2) 
11f*(2).X,(2)+2,f,(2)X~(2)-0.5c,-0.5L+~,-~~;, 
subject to: 




(b) -u, +uz-sO, 
0.2u, - o.2u2 < 0, 
(c) x,(l)+xz(l)+~2(l)-0.2~,(2)-0.2.~,(2)=0.5, 
x,(2)+X,(2)-y,(1)+0.2~,(2)+0.2y,(2)=0.5 
(d) x2( 1) -0.2x,(2)-0.2x,(2) = 0, 
(e) 5x,(1)-5, GO, 
4x,( 1) - 5, d 0, 
642) - tz d 0, 
6x,(2)-5,<& 
(f) f,(l)+.f2(1)= 13 
f,(2) +j;v) = 1, 
The above quadratic program was solved with the help of SOL/NPSOL 
Fortran package for nonlinear programming (see Gill et a/. [ 131). This 
routine was initiated at 4’ = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 
and yielded the solution (with a 3 decimal place roundoff) 
6” = (0, 1, .3, .7, 0, ,167, .416, .416, 0, ,551, 0, 1.09, 3.667, 
3.667, .667, 1.333, .667, 2.5). 
and the objective value of + .l 1lE - 15 which was accepted as 0. Now. 
applying the Main Theorem of Section 3 we obtain a stationary Nash 
Equilibrium point (fO, g”) in the original undiscounted game, where ,I”’ = 
((0, l), (.3, .7)), and g”= ((0, 1), (.5, .5)). Since by fixingf”(g”) we obtain a 
2-state Markovian Decision Process for player II (I), it can be easily 
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verified that (f”, g”) is indeed a Nash Equilibrium Point of our game. The 
above computation took approximately 4.8 CPU set on the VAX 11/780. 
REFERENCES 
1. 0. L. MANGASARIAN AND H. STONE, Two-person nonzero-sum games and quadratic 
programming, J. Marh. Anal. Appl. 9 (1964), 348-355. 
2. T. PARTHASARATHY AND T. E. S. RAGHAVAN, An orderfield property for stochastic games 
when one player controls transition probabilities, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 33 (1981). 
375-392. 
3. 0. J. VRIEZE, Linear programming and undiscounted stochastic games in which one 
player controls transitions, OR Spektrum 3 (1981), 29-35. 
4. A. HORDIJK AND L. C. M. KALLENBERG, Linear programming and Markov games I, in 
“Game Theory and Mathematical Economics” (0. Moeschlin and D. Pallasche, Eds.), 
291-305. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1981. 
5. A. HORDIJK AND L. C. M. KALLENBERG, Linear programming and Markov games II, in 
“Game Theory and Mathematical Economics” (0. Moemschlin and D. Pallaschke, Eds.), 
pp. 307-320, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 198 I. 
6. J. A. FILAR AND T. E. S. RAGHAVAN, A matrix game solution to a single-controller 
stochastic game, Math. Opar. Res. 9 (l984), 356-362. 
7. J. A. FILAR, On stationary equilibria of a single-controller stochastic game, Math. 
Programming 30 (1984), 313-325. 
8. A. HORUIJK ANII L. C. M. KALLENBERG, Linear programming and Markov decision 
chains, Managmzent SC?. 25 ( 1979), 352-362. 
9. P. D. ROGERS, Non-zero-sum Stochastic Games,” Ph.D. Thesis, Report ORC 69-8, 
Operations Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, 1969. 
IO. M. J. S~BEL, Noncooperative Stochastic Games, Ann. of Math. Statist. 42 (!971), 
193&1935. 
11. C. DERMAN. “Finite State Markovian Decision Processes,” Academic Press, New York, 
1970. 
12. L. C. M. KALLENBERG, “Linear Programming and Finite Markovian Control Problems,” 
Mathematical Centre Tracts 148, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1983. 
13. P. E. GILL, W. MURRAY. M. A. SAIJNDERS, ANU M. H. WRIGHT, “User’s Guide for 
SOL/NPSOL: A Fortran Package for Nonlinear Programming,” Technical Report 
SOL 83-12. Stanford University, Stanford, California. 1983. 
